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Abstract 
 
This research aims to explore on the contradicting decisions of the High Court and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal on several issues of the law, pertaining to whether a term that 
operates harshly on its own offends against the public policy; whether the relaxation of 
the pacta sunt servanda in this case would result in the court interfering with the 
agreement of parties; whether the court can develop the common law by infusing the spirit 
of Ubuntu and Good faith resulting in the invalidation of a material term i.e., the 
cancellation clause. This study is centred on the Supreme Court of Appeal decision of 
Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) v Southern Sun Hotel Interest (Pty) Ltd. 
 In essence, this research will articulate on whether the Constitutional abstract values can 
be used to relax the maxim and to what extent. In essence, my proposed study aims to 
explore and discuss the change in the position of landlords who wish to rely on strict 
application of contractual terms and the implication of subsequent and ensuing cases with 
regards to the application of the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda weighed against the 
constitutional abstract values of Ubuntu, fairness, reasonableness and the principle of 
good faith and public policy. 
In addition, this dissertation aims to examine whether the constitutional values still have 
a place in law, specifically in the interpretation of lease contracts. The weighing up of the 
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda against the principles of Ubuntu, fairness, 
reasonableness and public policy. Ascertaining whether in certain circumstances, the 
implementation of the cancellation clause contained in the agreement may manifestly be 
unreasonable and offend against public policy. Therefore, inevitably discussing whether 
a clause that insists on compliance with its provisions regardless of the circumstances, 
which prevented compliance, is unreasonable, unfair and contrary to publicpolicy. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
The South African Constitution created a court system in which the constitutional court 
and the supreme court of appeal are the highest courts in all matters. The Constitution 
binds all courts in their respective fields of final jurisdiction, resulting in the principle of 
stare decisis.1 Since the entry into force of the 1996 Constitution the bill of rights 
represents a value system that requires every rule of contract law that contradicts it to be 
declared invalid. In the minority judgment of Olivier JA in the case of Eerste Nasionale 
Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO2 the judge stated that “on the basis of that 
in the circumstances of the case, principles of bona fides, equity or good faith militated 
against the strict application of established rules of contract between the parties, though 
such enforcement may be dictated by the strict rules of contract”.  
 
It has been established that good faith, reasonableness and fairness do not provide an 
independent or free-floating basis for interfering with the contractual basis.3 This study 
involves the most recent supreme court of appeal decision in the case of Mohamed’s 
Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd.4 In this case the 
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda and the privity of a contract was weighed against the 
constitutional abstract principles of fairness, reasonableness and public policy. In 
essence it involves the cancellation of a contract of lease on the grounds of default in 
payment caused by an error on the part of the lessee’s bank.  
 
                                                             
1  Brand “The role of good faith, equity and fairness in the South African law of contract: The influence 
of common law and the Constitution” 2009 SALJ 71. 
2  1997 4 SA 302 (SCA). 
3  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA). 
4  2018 2 SA 314 (SCA). 
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1.2 Problem statement 
 
This study aims to analyse the decision of the high court in comparison to that of the 
supreme court of appeal in relation to the weight of the constitutional abstract values 
against the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda in which the issue in the case concerned was 
whether, in developing the common law in accordance with section 39(2) of the 
Constitution, the constitutional values of the concepts of ubuntu and fairness dictate that 
the maxim pacta sunt servanda ought to be relaxed.The strict application of this doctrine 
and the impermissibility of infusing principles of ubuntu and good faith in the 
circumstances of a lease contract formed the basis of the study. The influence of abstract 
constitutional values on the interpretation of contracts results in the undermining of 
freedom of contract and legal certainty.  
 
CHAPTER 2:  INFLUENCE OF THE LEGISLATIVE REGULATION ON THE  
CONTRACTUAL RELATONSHIP, PARTICULARLY THE LEASE 
AGREEMENT  
 
2.1 Application of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 in 
 contractual relationships  
 
In accordance with section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, it has 
been established that the Constitution is the supreme law of South Africa and as much 
as all law is subject to it, there is no sacred sphere of commercial contract law. Although 
the source of the South African law of contract Africa is the common law, considering that 
constitutional transformation involves the process of furthering social justice, it is also 
declared in section 39(2) of the Constitution that the common law should be developed in 
accordance with the spirit, purport and objects of the bill of rights. 
 
This means that contract law, even commercial contract law, must be sensitive to the 
context of the South African situation, with its attendant socio-economic challenges. 
Through the medium of indirect development of the common law, the constitutional court 
 
 
   9 
 
has attempted to convert contract law in line with its own view of contractual justice. This 
development is also mirrored in a wide array of statutes aimed at ameliorating specific 
aspects of the law of contract, particularly in sectors where there is inequality of 
bargaining power, such as employment law, consumer law and the law of residential 
leases. The legislative and judicial context in which South African commercial contract 
law operates thus has changed dramatically in its post-apartheid setting. 
 
In the matter of Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests 
(Pty) Ltd the Supreme Court of Appeal recently considered whether the common law 
principle of pacta sunt servanda should be developed by importing the principles of 
ubuntu and fairness into the law of contract.5 In the supreme court of appeal case, which 
is the focal point of this research, the court recently considered whether the common law 
principle of pacta sunt servanda should be developed by importing the principles of 
ubuntu and fairness (practically constitutional values) into the law of contract. Put 
differently, can one conclude that a hard-hitting contractual term is constitutionally unfair 
and therefore unenforceable? For legal certainty purposes, it then becomes necessary to 
explore how legislation that specifically regulates private contractual relationships 
promotes fairness, because this research will have no impact if it seems to ignore rules, 
particularly those most relevant to lease agreements.  
 
2.2  Relevant legislation other than the constitution  
2.2.1 General 
Before the case of Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings is discussed in detail, a general 
exposition will be given of statutes that may be relevant to similar cases. These include 
the Consumer Protection Act6 and the National Credit Act.7 
 
2.2.2 Consumer Protection Act 
 
                                                             
5  Manolios “Pacta sunt servanda v ubuntu” 2018 Without Prejudice 32. 
6  68 of 2008. 
7  34 of 2005. 
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The Consumer Protection Act is not necessarily applicable in this instance because of the 
monetary requirement set by the Act, namely, an annual asset value in terms of section 
5(2)(b) of R2 000 000.8 The annual turnover of the respondent’s hotel division in South 
Africa runs into millions,9 which for the year 2017 was R14 000 000, which is the total 
comprehensive income for the period as reflected in the group’s statements in Sun 
International’s audited financial statement of 2017.10 It is important to consider those 
lease agreements where the juristic person is within the monetary threshold of R 
2 000 000 as per section 5(2)(b) of the act since the case has set a precedent for all 
subsequent cases involving a similar legal question.  
 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to acknowledge while the act contains provisions that the 
terms and conditions in a contract must be fair, just and reasonable, this does not 
necessarily entail that the act provides for all instances conditions that require strict 
application are to be unreasonable and unfair.11 The purpose of the act is to “promote a 
fair, accessible and sustainable marketplace for consumer products and services and for 
that purpose to establish national norms and standards relating to consumer protection”. 
In terms of the act, the rental of residential property is considered a service, meaning that 
parties to such agreements need to take cognisance of the provisions thereof.12 
 
It is worth noting that a landlord is required to give a tenant between 40 and 80 days’ 
notice either of terminating the agreement or alerting the tenant of any material changes 
that will be implemented upon the renewal of an agreement.13 The Consumer Protection 
Act provides for both administrative and judicial control of unfair contract terms across a 
broad range of consumer contracts.14 One of the most emphasised consumer rights is 
the right to fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions. It is my view that it is prudent 
                                                             
8  s 5(2)(b) and Government Gazette 34181 (1 April 2011). 
9  Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interest (Pty) Ltd 2017 4 SA 243 (GJ) 
30. 
10 https://corporate.suninternational.com/content/dam/approved/corporate/investors/results/sun-
international-afs-10-april-2018.pdf.  
11  Freebody “The effect of the CPA on lease agreement-consumer law” 2016 Without Prejudice 22. 
12  s 1 of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. 
13  n 9. 
14  Sharrock “Judicial control of unfair contract terms: The implications of the Consumer Protection 
Act” 2010 22 SA Merc LJ 297. 
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for all lessors of residential premises to take note of the Consumer Protection Act when 
entering into lease agreements, as the consequences of not adhering to the act could be 
detrimental to the lessor.15  
 
Therefore, if parties to a lease agreement fail to adhere to the provisions contained in the 
Consumer Protection Act, it may result in the lease agreement or a part of it being 
declared void and unenforceable.16 It is clear that the act does not leave room for any 
subjective discretion on the part of the court to establish what may be considered too 
harsh so as to be unenforceable. It simply refers to the adherence to provisions of the 
act. 
 
The addition of the Consumer Protection Act to the proprietary law landscape, specifically 
as far as lease agreements are concerned, has created protection for consumers, in this 
case tenants, in that it has limited the extent of one-sided lease agreements, which were 
previously governed by common law. In light of this it is important for property owners 
and tenants to seek expert legal advice regarding the regulation of their relationship and 
to protect themselves from abuse and sanctions in terms of the law.17  
 
The court would have been required to develop the common law as may be necessary to 
improve the realisation and enjoyment of consumer rights generally.18 
 
2.2.3 National Credit Act 
 
A contract of lease may be described as an agreement by the lessor to let the use and 
enjoyment of a property in return for payment.19 The National Credit Act describes “lease” 
as an agreement in terms of which the temporary possession of any movable property is 
delivered to or at the direction of the consumer, or the right to use any such property is 
                                                             
15  n 9. 
16  Kerr The Law of Sale and Lease (2004) 245. 
17  Freebody (n 9 above) 23. 
18  s 8(2)(b). 
19  n 14. 
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granted to or at the direction of the consumer; payment for the possession or use of the 
property is made on an agreed or determined periodic basis during the life of the 
agreement and interest, fees or other charges are payable to the credit provider in respect 
of the agreement, or the amount that has been deferred.20 
 
It is worth nothing that at the end of the term of the agreement, the ownership of the 
property either passes to the consumer absolutely or passes to the consumer upon 
satisfaction of specific conditions set out in the agreement.21 The lease under discussion 
does not contain a provision that states that ownership of the property passes from the 
lessor to the lessee and, therefore, does not fall under the act. Further, the act does not 
apply in the circumstances of the case as section 8(2)(b) states that an agreement, 
irrespective of its form, is not a credit agreement if it pertains to an immovable property. 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: DISCUSSION OF THE CASE OF MOHAMED’S LEISURE 
HOLDINGS (PTY) LTD v SOUTHERN SUN HOTEL INTERESTS 
(PTY) LTD 
 
3.1 Facts of the case 
 
On 1 November 2001 Southern Sun Hotel Interests (the respondent) as the lessee 
concluded a written lease agreement with Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (the appellant) 
as the lessor.22 The parties agreed that the rental was payable no later than the seventh 
day of each month.23 Accordingly, it was a material term of the agreement that should the 
respondent fail to pay the rental on the due date, the appellant would be entitled to cancel 
the lease and take possession of the property.24 It has been established that the hotel 
has been operating its business for approximately 35 years without any interruptions, and 
                                                             
20  s 1 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
21  n 16. 
22  Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd 2018 2 SA 314 
(SCA) par 4.  
23  Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd (n 7) par 7.  
24  Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd (n 20) par 5. 
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maintained regular and prompt rental payments after having instructed its bank to such 
effect.25  
 
This continued until June 2014 when the respondent failed to make payment of the rental 
in time.26 Subsequently, on the 20th of the month a letter was sent to the respondent by 
the appellant which afforded the respondent five days in which to remedy the breach. The 
appellant in the letter also warned that “should the respondent fail to pay the rent on the 
due date in future, no notice to remedy the breach would be given and the agreement will 
be cancelled forthwith and the respondent will be required to vacate the premises with 
immediate effect”.27 Although the respondent monitored its bank statements to ensure 
prompt payments, on 6 October the bank of the respondent failed to effect a credit transfer 
to the appellant’s account on time even though the account had been debited before the 
due date.28 The rent eventually was paid on the 20th of the month and the bank accepted 
responsibility for the delay.29  
 
In response to the question of cancellation of the lease and the threatened eviction the 
respondent’s attorney informed the appellant’s attorney that cancellation of the lease was 
unreasonable as the breach had occurred due to its banker’s error, and contended that 
the purported cancellation was contrary to the concepts of ubuntu, good faith and 
reasonableness.30 It is worth nothing that the high court granted an order of eviction on 
the grounds that the implementation of the cancellation clause would be manifestly 
unreasonable, unfair and would offend public policy.31 Therefore, the common law 
principle of pacta sunt servanda should be developed by importing or infusing the 
principles of ubuntu and fairness into the law of contract.32 The supreme court of appeal 
held that the fact that a term in a contract is unfair or may operate harshly does not in 
itself offend the values of the Constitution and is not against public policy and, further, 
                                                             
25  n 22.  
26  Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd (n 20) par 7.  
27  Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd (n 7) par 13. 
28  n 25. 
29  n 21. 
30  Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd (n 20) par 8. 
31  Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd (n 7) par 27. 
32  Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd (n 7) par 28. 
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that it is impermissible to develop the common law of contract by infusing the spirit of 
ubuntu and good faith so as to invalidate the term or clause in question. It was held that 
it would be untenable to relax the maxim of pacta sunt servanda as this would be 
tantamount to the courts concluding the agreement on behalf of the parties.33 
 
3.2 Critical analysis of the decision of the high court 
 
In the court of first instance it had to be determined whether in the circumstances of this 
case the implementation of the cancellation clause contained in the lease agreement 
would be manifestly unreasonable and would offend against public policy.34 The court 
made a value judgment based on constitutional concepts and abstract values and held 
that the agreement did not in any way offend public policy nor were the terms invoked by 
the respondent to effect the cancellation of the agreement unreasonable, unfair or 
objectionable on any other grounds.35 The court nevertheless refused to enforce a 
cancellation clause on the ground that implementing the clause would be contrary to the 
concept of ubuntu, in particular the notion of fairness implicit in the concept. The key to 
this approach is that it recognises fairness as an important part of the constitutional 
concept of ubuntu.36 It follows that the unfair enforcement of a contract may be refused 
on the basis that it conflicts with a constitutional value.37  
 
The essence of the contention put forward by Southern Sun was that the enforcement of 
the cancellation was unreasonable, the situation being unfair and against public policy.38 
It was advanced that public policy is informed by “the concept of good faith, ubuntu, 
fairness and simple justice between individuals” and that the common law principle of 
                                                             
33  Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd (n 20) par 19. 
34  Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd (n 7) par 20. 
35  Manolios (n 5) 28. 
36  Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd (n 7) par 28. 
37  Sharrock “Unfair enforcement of a contract and the constitutional norm of ubuntu: Mohamed’s 
Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd 2017 (4) SA 243 (GJ)” 2018 Obiter 39, 
218 and 219.  
38  Manolios (n 5) 32. 
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pacta servanda sunt should not be treated as “an idea to be above criticism” but should 
rather be developed to uphold the ubuntu values of the South African people.39  
 
The high court held that it was required to balance the late payment of the October rental, 
on the one hand, compared to the bank solely having to bear the blame for the late 
payment and the prospects of the disproportionate prejudice suffered in the event of 
eviction.40 With reference to Venter v Venter41 the court held that the position no longer 
is good in law because of the normative framework of the Constitution in developing the 
common law, and applied the value of ubuntu in order to conclude that an eviction order 
would offend constitutional values and that, therefore, the application must fail. Although 
it is suggested that a court may refuse to enforce a clause based on the ground of 
unfairness, it is uncertain whether this decision will be regarded as authoritative.42 In the 
case under discussion there are two types of contractual relationships, namely, a contract 
of letting and hiring and a contract of agency.  
 
The focus is on the former contract which entails that the lessor agrees that the lessee 
may have full or partial use or enjoyment of something for a certain period of time in return 
for the payment of a determined or determinable amount of money as rental.43 The bill of 
rights does not deny the existence of other rights, but the main point is that the right to 
freedom has to be consistent with the bill of rights. It is worth noting that a precedent has 
been set in that, when courts apply the common law they must do so by developing and 
ensuring consistency with the values of the Constitution. This was the case until the 
supreme court heard the case. This somehow took one back to the strict application of 
the common law. 
 
The principle endorsed in the case of Barkhuizen v Napier44 is the  following: a contractual 
provision that is in conflict with the values enshrined in the Constitution will be regarded 
                                                             
39  Manolios (n 5) 33. 
40  Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd (n 7) par 35. 
41  1949 1 SA 768 (A). 
42  Botha v Rich 2014 4 SA. 
43  Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contract in South Africa (2016) 134. 
44  2007 5 SA 323 (CC). 
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as contrary to public policy and consequently unenforceable. The constitutional court 
developed the public policy test into a two-stage approach in that a contract must not only 
be objectively reasonable but also be subjectively reasonable in the particular 
circumstances in order to be enforceable. In a majority judgment Ngcobo J stated that 
“[o]nce it is accepted that the clause does not violate public policy and non-compliance 
with it is established, the claimant is required to show that, in the circumstances of the 
case there was a good reason why there was a failure to comply”.45 Ngcobo J went on to 
say that the Constitution required parties to honour contractual obligations that had been 
freely and voluntarily taken and that “while it is necessary to recognise the doctrine of 
pacta sunt servanda, courts should be able to decline the enforcement of a clause if it 
would result in unfairness or would be unreasonable”.46 
 
In essence the constitutional court stated that the second subjective stage of the public 
policy test in terms of which a clause must not only objectively reasonable in order for it 
to be valid, but its effect must also be subjectively reasonable in the particular 
circumstances in order for it to be enforceable.47 Southern Sun depended on Barkhuizen 
for its contention that once it had been proven that there were conditions that prohibited 
compliance with contractual provisions, demanding consistency would be unfair and 
unreasonable.48 Southern Sun submitted that “the prejudice suffered by it would be far 
greater than the prejudice suffered by Mohamed’s if the cancellation in terms of clause 
20 was enforced”.49 The eviction of Southern Sun from the property it had occupied for 
the past 35 years would not only damage Southern Sun’s reputation in the hospitality 
industry but would also lead to the loss of some 91 jobs.50 Southern Sun therefore 
submitted that the principle of pacta sunt servanda should be relaxed and clause 20 
should not be enforced.”51 
 
                                                             
45  Barkhuizen v Napier (n 43) 58. 
46  Manolios (n 5 above) 33. 
47  Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Interests (Pty) Ltd (n 7) 15. 
48  Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd (n 7) 19. 
49  n 46. 
50  As above. 
51  Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd par 19 and 
Manolios (n 5) 33. 
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In the case of Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings the court stated that if the agreement s by all 
appearances was contrary to the constitutional values, the enforcement would not 
emerge. However, the enforcement of a prima facie innocent contract may implicate an 
identified constitutional value, but if the value is unjustifiably affected, the term will not be 
implemented.52 The example used to illustrate Mathopo J’s understanding was that of a 
term in a contract providing for the right of the lessee to sub-lease with the consent of the 
landlord.53 The term itself does not offend public policy, but if the landlord withheld his 
consent to prevent the property being sublet in circumstances amounting to discrimination 
under the equality clause, the term would not be enforced.54 
 
The same judge then turned to consider the facts of the Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings 
case and applied the two-stage public policy test developed in the Barkhuizen case.55 
The following facts were considered to be of utmost significance: the fact that the terms 
of the agreement were not, on its substance, inconsistent with public policy; the relative 
position of the parties was one of bargaining equality; the parties could have agreed on a 
provision before the agreement was cancelled; and, finally, the timeous performance by 
Southern Sun certainly was feasible.56 Southern Sun could have diarised well ahead of 
time to monitor this important monthly instalment and this could have influenced other 
methods of payment such as an electronic funds transfer.57 Therefore, once it has been 
proven that there were conditions that averted consistency with the contractual 
provisions, demanding the consistency thereof would be absurd and uncalled for, 
according to the contention of the respondent.58  
 
The precedent regarding the role of good faith in South African contract law remains the 
majority decision in Barkhuizen.59 The court confirmed the supreme court of appeal 
position in Brisley that good faith has a creative, a controlling and a legitimating or 
                                                             
52  n 44. 
53  As above.   
54  As above. 
55  Manolios (n 5) 34. 
56  n 53. 
57  As above. 
58  Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd (n 7) 16. 
59  Barkhuizen (n 44). 
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explanatory function and that “the concepts of justice, reasonableness and fairness 
constitute good faith”.60 
 
One of the views that was recognised in our legal system and which has brought 
perspective that influenced the advancement of contract law frequently at the 
inconsistency with the perspectives that of the Constitutional Court is that of Wallis, 
Justice of the court.61 He has contended in his own and judicial capacities for an objective, 
contextual approach to the interpretation of commercial agreements, drawing extensively 
on the work of Lord Hoffmann.62  
 
In one instance the decision in Everfresh had to be examined when advocacy, legal and, 
without a doubt, individual experience was under debate, featuring the way in which 
eviction essentially includes the lessee playing for time. This type of reasonable 
understanding, which is hard to infuse into a decision based on the literal interpretation 
of a written contract, is of exceptionally important relevance resolved from the surrounding 
circumstances and surely from “commercial common sense”. It is difficult to debate that 
commercial law should reflect commercial practice and business norms.63 
 
In contrast, a stronger role for human rights contemplation and more prominent 
development of the current customary law of contract, with the emphasis being placed on 
protecting the weaker party, was written by an academic at a South African university, 
Bhana.64 His contentions feature the genuine situation of a large sector of the South 
African population that lacked education and literacy on finance or resources in order to 
contend on a level playing field with more resourced business contracting parties.65  
 
                                                             
60  Brisley (n 4). 
61  Hutchison “Relational theory, context and commercial common sense: views on contract 
interpretation and adjudication” 2017 SALJ 296 and 315. 
62  Hutchison (n 59) 316. 
63  n 60. 
64  As above. 
65  As above. 
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The problem of inequality of bargaining power is a critical one which goes to the core of 
discussions around inappropriately acquired, mistake in contract formation, capacity to 
contract, validity and enforceability of contract.66 These are circumstantial factors. The 
court has expressly called for more noteworthy subjective mindfulness in contract 
mediation, requesting that courts enquire as to who the parties to an agreement are and 
the conditions under which they contracted. This is a contention for social equity in 
contract law or, in other words, in the post-politically-sanctioned racial segregation 
contracting setting.67 
 
Both schools of thought consolidate a greater role for context in contract adjudication, the 
only difference being that the former author focused more on consumers while the latter 
advocated commercial orientation.68 In some instances where public policy already has 
an impact on the interpretation of contracts such as where the terms of an agreement 
exclude a party’s liability in respect of wrongful acts committed in a contract, or where the 
general rule states that absurdities should be avoided in instances of cancellation of a 
statement or rather a clause of a contract, or covenants of restraints of trade or where the 
party endeavours to utilise a term for a reason other than that initially agreed upon.69  
 
In Wells v South African Alumenite Company70 it was stated that “[i]f there is one thing 
which, more than another, public policy requires, it is that men of full age in competent 
understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts, when 
entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred and enforced by the courts of 
justice”.71  
 
It has been stated that it has been established that the power to declare agreements 
contrary to public policy must be exercised with caution and only in instances where the 
case is neither vague nor ambiguous in order to avoid uncertainty in respect of the validity 
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of a contract that stems from an indiscriminate abuse of power.72 One should be careful 
not to conclude that a contract is contrary to public policy merely because its terms (or 
some of them) offend one’s individual sense of proprietary and fairness.73 The courts had 
always upheld that it is unacceptable to invalidate contacts due substantive unfairness 
because of the respect for the right to freedom and sanctity of a contract. This was the 
position before the precedent set by Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes. Evidently, since the 
decision in the latter case, in a number of cases the contractual terms have been struck 
down on this basis.74 
 
3.2.1 Role of public policy 
 
Public policy is dictated by courts based on values and norms that mirror the community’s 
sense of justice and it is impacted by natural law, the 1996 Constitution, international law 
and comparative law.75 
 
On the one hand, Jansen JA has stated that “to enforce a grossly unreasonable contract 
may in appropriate circumstances be considered as against public policy or boni mores”.76 
On the other hand, Smalberger JA has stated that the power to declare a contract contrary 
to public policy should be exercised sparingly and only in the clearest of cases, lest 
uncertainty as to the validity of contracts results from an arbitrary and indiscriminate use 
of the power.77  
 
As stated above, one should be careful not to conclude that a contract is contrary to public 
policy merely because its terms offend one’s individual sense of propriety and fairness. 
This inevitably means that the doctrine should be invoked in circumstances in which the 
harm to the public is incontestable and this does not depend on inferences of a few judicial 
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minds.78 In accordance with the case of Standard Bank of SA v Wilkinson the court stated 
that public policy can only be invoked in cases where the contract is so unreasonable that 
the harm to the public is substantially incontestable.79 Although the law commission has 
previously proposed that courts be afforded the jurisdiction to amend or rescind a contract 
that, in its view, is unreasonable, unconscionable or oppressive, parliament has not 
reacted to such proposal.80  
 
3.2.2 Fairness, reasonableness, ubuntu and good faith 
 
Contractual fairness at best is a matter of applying doctrines such as good faith or 
conscionability.81 Old Authority on Unfairness has adopted a clear position on the unfair 
enforcement of a contract, namely, that unfairness does not or cannot render the 
enforcement offensive to public policy.82 The supreme court of appeal in the case under 
discussion has rejected the idea that good faith is an independent legal principle. The 
court’s view is that good faith, reasonableness and fairness are no more than abstract 
values that perform creative, informative or controlling functions through established rules 
of contract law, and that the appropriate mechanism for judicial control of contract 
enforcement is public policy, not overlooking the fact that allowing judges to refuse to 
implement contractual provisions on the basis of unfairness will give rise to intolerable 
legal and commercial uncertainty. 
 
Perhaps the most memorable instance was the use of “good faith” in interpreting the 
obligations of the parties in SAFCOL v York Timbers.83 In this case the supreme court of 
appeal, despite taking a conservative stance on the role of good faith as not constituting 
an independently enforceable duty in contract law in one part of the judgment, 
nevertheless found York to be in breach of contract, due to its continued efforts to frustrate 
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SAFCOL's exercise of its rights to adjust the terms of the contract.84 This case represents 
a clear use of good faith in contractual interpretation to address an issue of a failure in 
bad faith to co-operate under a long-term relational contract.85 
 
Existing doctrinal mechanisms such as interpretation (as in SAFCOL above), a refusal to 
award specific performance (as in Haynes v King William's Town Municipality), or 
supervening impossibility (for which the change of circumstances must be objective and 
absolute) are not fully capable of addressing all forms of hardship. A potential avenue of 
redress using a failed common supposition as to the future to render a contract void was 
cut short by the supreme court of appeal in Van Reenen Steel (Pty) Ltd v Smith NO.86 It 
is hoped that the future development of the South African law of contract will find a way 
of dealing with this vital aspect of relational contracting. 
 
Nevertheless, the constitutional court still has to give a final ruling on the role of good faith 
in contractual agreements. 
 
Everfresh case87 
 
If a court were to entertain the argument in Everfresh, the underlying notion of good faith 
in contract law, the maxim of the contractual doctrine that agreements seriously entered 
into should be enforced, and the value of ubuntu, which inspires much of our constitutional 
compact, may tilt the argument in its favour. A common law principle that renders an 
obligation to negotiate enforceable cannot be said to be inconsistent with the sanctity of 
the contract and the important moral denominator of good faith. Indeed, the enforceability 
of a principle of this kind accords with and is an important component of the process of 
the development of a new constitutional contractual order. 
 
Good faith analysis: 
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(a) Purely commercial dispute: Assuming that there is a standard of good faith 
applicable to the negotiation phase of contracting, the commercial nature of the 
agreement surely have should implications when determining what is reasonable 
in the context of the parties' dispute. 
(b) There is no deadlock-breaking mechanism: Southernport Developments requires 
a method of resolving potential disputes during the negotiation phase for such a 
clause to be enforceable. 
By the insertion of an arbitration clause by which disagreement could be 
authoritatively settled. Thus a duty to negotiate (in good faith) beyond the plain 
meaning of the provision must rest either on the implication of such a term into the 
contract or a development of the default rules of the common law of contract. 
(c) I would argue that a clearer definition as to what constitutes good faith, or the 
related concept of ubuntu, is required in the interests of justice. 
 
Good faith as a legally enforceable duty should best be determined objectively, with 
reference to the context of contracting. The test of what is a reasonable expectation in 
the context of the parties' relationship works well here. 
 
Before the discussion of the decision of the supreme court of appeal, it is crucial to note 
and appreciate that the high court acknowledged the precedent set by Venter v Venter88 
where the bank was a mere agent of the tenant and the obligation to timeously make 
rental payment was the obligation of the tenant, and there was no legal obligation on the 
landlord to issue an “ultimatum” prior to cancelling the lease. 
 
Moseneke DCJ stated that had the case been properly pleaded, a number of interlinking 
constitutional values would inform a development of the common law. Indeed, it is highly 
desirable and in fact necessary to infuse the law of contract with the constitutional values 
of ubuntu, which inspire much of our constitutional impact. The concept of ubuntu 
empahsises the communal nature of society and carries with in the ideas of humanness, 
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social justice and fairness and envelopes the key values of group solidarity, compassion, 
respect for human dignity, a conformity to basic norms and collective unity. 
 
In Botha v Rich NO and Others Nkabinde J stated that the principle of reciprocity falls 
within the understanding of good faith and freedom of contract, based on one ’s own 
dignity and freedom as well as respect for the dignity and freedom of others. Honouring 
a contract, therefore, cannot be a matter of each side pursuing his or her own self-interest 
without regard to the other party’s interests. Therefore, good faith is the lens through 
which we come to understand contracts. 
 
3.3 Criticism of the decision of the supreme court of appeal 
 
This study is centred on the supreme court of appeal decision in Mohamed’s Leisure 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd89 which is supported by the 
case of Roazar CC v The Falls Supermarket CC.90 In the supreme court of appeal it is 
notable that Van den Heever JA in Venter v Venter stated that “[i]f the creditor must bear 
the consequences of mora where his health or the weather fails him, it seems to me not 
unreasonable that the debtor should bear the consequences where the bank fails him”.91 
It is necessary to ensure that the outcome of any case does not depend on a personal 
sense of fairness and reasonableness as this leads to uncertainty in contractual 
enforcement. One of the main issues in this case is whether good faith is an independent 
substantive value embodying principles such as fairness, reasonableness and justice on 
the basis on which courts can decline the enforcement of a contract. 
 
The respondent argued that the impugned clause should be interpreted to mean that 
parties to a contract ought to act in good faith, rendering the clause flexible to 
accommodate circumstances where a party is prevented by factors beyond its control 
from complying with the requirement of the clause.92 It was also argued that because of 
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the duration of the lease, the circumstances leading to the alleged breach (the fact that 
the appellant had no control over the bank’s internal system) and the timeous efforts by 
the respondent to purge the default by ensuring that payments were made on time by 
monitoring its bank statements, it cannot be argued that the respondent adopted a supine 
attitude.93 
 
In this respect the appellant contended that the clause is unreasonable because it insists 
on compliance with its provisions regardless of the circumstances that prevented 
compliance thereof.94 Furthermore, the clause should be interpreted through the prism of 
the bill of rights in order to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the bill of rights.95 
However, the respondent submitted that the act of cancellation of the contract was mala 
fide as the appellant had failed to notify the respondent of the breach to enable it to rectify 
the non-payment within a short space of time. The respondent submitted that had this 
been the case, they could have rectified the error.96  
 
This is where the balancing and weighing up of the principle of pacta sunt servanda 
against the constitutional values were necessary. As indicated above, the supreme court 
of appeal rejected the notion that values such as good faith are independent. No evidence 
was led that any of Southern Sun’s constitutional rights had been infringed by the 
enforcement of the cancellation clause. It would have been incorrect, therefore, for the 
pacta sunt servanda maxim to have been relaxed. The cancellation of the lease 
agreement was upheld and Southern Sun was ordered to vacate the property. 
 
One lesson one may learn from the above decision of the supreme court of appeal is that 
the courts are perhaps now intending to guarantee the consistent and coherent 
application of the freedom of contract doctrine, even having regard to the fact that 
injustices might ensue from its application. The question then arises as to whether this 
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means that the values and the moral ethos of the constitution no longer are guaranteed 
in all other laws that are subordinate to the supreme law of the land. 
 
I do not intend to be the voice that threatens the transformation and favour only traditional 
liberal notions of the common law, such as the principle of pacta sunt servanda, as this 
would inevitably mean that I enjoin the constitution in the legitimation of the unjust status 
quo in the law of contract. 
 
3.4 Current legal position: the strict adherence of the doctrine of pacta sunt 
servanda without the influence of the constitutional abstract values 
 
3.4.1 Doctrine of pacta sunt servanda 
 
This doctrine stems from the constitutional values of dignity and freedom. Cameron JA 
stated that contractual autonomy is part of the liberty to regulate one’s life by freely-
engaged contractual arrangements.97 The doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, also known 
as privity and sanctity of contract, entails that contractual obligations must be honoured 
where parties have freely and voluntarily entered into a contractual agreement. This 
notion goes hand in hand with freedom of contract which denotes that parties are free to 
enter into and decide on the terms of a contract. This principle is necessary because if 
the principle is overlooked, there would be an absence of integrity between the 
contracting parties. 
 
The fact that parties freely and voluntarily enter into agreements gives effect to their 
constitutional right of freedom to contract. This is one of the reasons why our courts have 
time and time again upheld the principle. A failure by the courts to do so may lead to the 
imposition of the court’s own sense of fairness and, as a result, the creation of a contract 
that was not initially agreed to or intended by the parties. In Mozart Ice Cream Franchises 
(Pty) Ltd v Davidoff98 Davis J held that “[w]ithout this principle, the law of contract would 
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be subject to gross uncertainty, judicial whim and an absence of integrity between the 
contracting parties”.99 The fact that a term in a contract is unfair or may operate harshly 
does not in itself lead to the conclusion that it offends the values the constitution or is 
against public policy. It is not permissible for a court to develop the common law of 
contract by infusing the spirit of ubuntu and good faith so as to invalidate the term or 
clause in question. Where parties freely and voluntarily and with the prerequisite animus 
contrahendi agreed to negotiate in good faith and to conclude further substantive 
agreements that were renewable over a period of time, it is untenable to relax the maxim 
of pacta sunt servanda as this would be tantamount to the court creating the agreement 
for the parties. When a written contract is resolved on a general perception of the court, 
it demoralises its commercial usefulness. 
 
3.4.2 Roazar CC v The Falls Supermarket CC100 
 
It would be against public policy to coerce a lessor to conclude an agreement with a tenant 
it no longer wants. It is also difficult to conceive how a court, in a purely business 
transaction, can rely on ubuntu to import a term that was not intended by the parties.  
 
3.4.3 Brisley v Drotsky101 
 
It has been established that the constitutional abstract values are fundamental to our law. 
However, these values do not constitute independent, substantive rules that courts can 
employ to intervene in contractual relationships and, therefore, cannot be directly acted 
upon by courts. Although these values perform certain functions in our law, they cannot 
be directly acted upon. The court also held that courts can only interfere with contractual 
relationships if permitted by the rules of hard law but do not constitute hard law 
themselves. It is an accepted notion that judges can refuse to enforce a contractual 
                                                             
99  n 36. 
100  n 87. 
101  2002 4 SA 1 (SCA). 
 
 
   28 
 
provision merely because it offends their personal sense of fairness and equity, which 
gives rise to intolerable legal uncertainty. 
 
3.4.4 Afrox Health Care Ltd v Strydom102 
 
The court confirmed the decision in Brisley v Drotsky and held that good faith, 
reasonableness and fairness do not constitute an independent basis for interference by 
courts with contractual obligations. 
 
3.4.5 South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd103 
 
The court has no power to deviate from the intention of the parties, as determined through 
the interpretation of the contract, merely because it may be regarded as unfair to one of 
the parties. However, in the interpretation process the notions of fairness and good faith 
that underlie the law of contract once again have a role to play. While a court is not entitled 
to superimpose on the clearly-expressed intention of the parties its notion of fairness, the 
position is different where a contract is ambiguous. In this case the principle that all 
contracts are governed by good faith is applied and the intention of the parties is 
determined on the basis that they negotiated with one another in good faith. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal decision stated that “if there was one thing which, more 
than another, public policy requires, it is that men of full age in competent understanding 
shall have the outmost liberty of contracting, and their contracts, when entered into freely 
and voluntarily, shall be held sacred and enforced by the courts of Justice in Wells v South 
African Alumenite Company 1927 AD 69”.  
 
In Bredenkamp v Standard Bank104 Ngcobo J stated that public policy importing notions 
of fairness, justice and reasonableness in the Barkhuizen case meant that these notions 
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do not extend beyond instances where public policy considerations entrenched in the 
Constitution or elsewhere would be implicated. A lessee is bound to pay the proper 
amount of the rental on the due date and/or time and place stipulated or implied in the 
lease. A tenant who is in mora by paying the rental late has breached the contract 
regardless of whether it has made an effort to pay some days later. 
 
The case of Birkenruth Estates (Pty) Ltd v Unitrans Motors (Pty) Ltd105 dealt with 
instances where the right to cancellation arose and where parties have stipulated in the 
contract that time would be of the essence. Since the lease agreement in Mohamed’s 
Leisure Holdings contained no obligation to serve a demand prior to a notice of 
cancellation of the lease agreement, it was unnecessary for the proceedings to be 
conducted in terms of section 32 of the Magistrate’s Court Act. The notice of cancellation 
could have been effected by way of summons or any notice other than judicial procedure. 
The lessee bears the onus to prove payment if this is his defence.106 In terms of banking 
practice payment is effected when the bank account of the creditor is credited with the 
amount as agreed upon. 
 
In cases such as Crown Restaurant the court leaned towards the endorsement of the 
hemogenic ordering in our law that favours the principle of freedom of contract, thereby 
leaving a door open for potential role as part of the public policy test. Perhaps the common 
law has again surfaced here because in the aforesaid case the argument was that 
freedom of contract would not be enforced on the grounds of public policy.107 Everyone 
has the freedom to enter into a contract with whomever he or she chooses, as long as 
the nature and the subject matter thereof fall with the parameters of the law.108 
 
The fact that parties freely and voluntarily enter into agreements gives effect to their 
Constitutional right to freedom to contract. This is one of the reasons why our courts have 
time and again upheld the principle. A failure by our courts to do so may lead to an 
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imposition of the court’s own sense of fairness and, as a result, the creation of a contract 
that was not initially agreed to or intended by the parties. In Mozart Ice Cream Franchise 
(Pty) Ltd v Davidoff109 Davies J held that without this principle the law of contract would 
be subject to gross uncertainty, judicial whim and an absence of integrity between the 
contracting parties. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
4.1 Post-Constitutional Legislation  
 
The need for constitutional transformation of the law stems from section 39(1)(a) which 
provides that a court, tribunal or forum, when interpreting the bill of rights itself, must 
promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom when it comes to the interpretation of the bill of rights itself. The 
relevance of the application of the constitution lies in the direct horizontal application of 
the bill of rights, especially the law of contract with reference to the boni mores, good faith 
and public interest if and when there are any rights that clash and have to be weighed 
against each other. 
 
I submit that the court ought to reassess its approach to constitutional values, in general, 
and the importance of the liberal notion of freedom of contract, in particular. It is about 
time the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provided an opportunity to develop 
the common law to give reconciliation to the reality of the changing and dynamic society 
and its values. This entails that there is an urgent need for a shift to democratising the 
law of contract, to end the feudalistic link that persists in landlord-tenant relationships. 
 
I agree perhaps one definitive solution is to have a statutory requirement for standard 
terms in contracts based on fairness and reasonableness. The influence of the 
constitution in respect of the law of contract implies that the mere reliance on freedom of 
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contract as the basis of contractual relationships will not suffice, neither will an 
interpretation of a contract that attempts to legitimise liberal ideology. Therefore, a review, 
adaptation, reinterpretation and expansion of the traditional boni mores, public interest 
and good faith are necessary in order to align these notions with the new values and 
principles in the constitution.  
 
In South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd110 Brand JA explained the basis of 
the principle as follows:  
 
“Although abstract values such as good faith, reasonableness and fairness are 
fundamental to our law of contract, they do not constitute independent substantive 
rules that courts can employ to intervene in contractual relations. These abstract 
values perform creative, informative and controlling functions through established 
rules of the law of contract. They cannot be acted upon by the courts directly.”111 
 
Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes112 and subsequent appeal court cases make it clear that a term, 
or an entire contract, may be so unfair as to be contrary to public policy. Therefore, merely 
because reasonableness and unfairness are abstract values does not mean that they 
cannot be determinative of public policy on a particular issue. This means that if a point 
can be reached where substantive unfairness is offensive to public policy, then surely a 
point can be reached where the enforcement of a valid provision becomes sufficiently 
unfair to be offensive to public policy. The court also warned that one must be careful not 
to conclude that a contract is contrary to public policy merely because its terms offend 
one’s individual sense of propriety and fairness.113 
 
The development of our contract law thus far has been shaped by colonial legal tradition 
represented by English law, Roman law and Roman-Dutch law, regulating the 
environment within which trade and commerce takes place. This approach places a 
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higher value on negotiating in good faith than would otherwise have been the case.114 
While still focused on the case of Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings, the court once again held 
that ultimately one had to strike a balance between the law of contract and the value of 
ubuntu. 
 
In the judgment of Beadica 231 CC v Trustees, Oregon Unit Trust115 Davis J contended 
that the if honouring a contract was not merely a matter of each side pursuing his or her 
own self-interest and that if that is not the exclusive lens through which the our contract 
law should be evaluated, then in order to promote a more nuanced focus, the fact that 
the applicants faced a real prospect that their business would close down and their 
franchise agreements would inevitably be terminated, being an all-black business as part 
of the BEE transaction, the court’s decision was in favour of the applicants who had failed 
to adhere to a provision of the contract and exercised their right to renewal of contract.  
 
The court further stated that where legal certainty is said to be undermined if the 
enforcement of contractual obligations is to be independent upon a judicial sense of 
reasonableness, fairness and good faith rather than in terms of the contract, legal change 
may introduce a rule of law for the protection of many people without the detrimental 
consequences suggested. The judge further stated that this approach should not 
necessarily be followed where the consequences of the breach of a contract was 
reasonably foreseen and the remedy was appropriate. 
 
4.2 Conclusion 
Sharrock, a professor of law, once asked what particular standards are to be connected 
to guarantee that the result in a specific case does not rely on individual quirks of the 
individual judge and to keep uncalled-for implementation from turning into a “final resort” 
safeguard of the “refractory and generally exposed” account holder. This stems from the 
statement of the court in which it stated “that the enforcement of a contract may be so 
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unfair as to be contrary to the value of ubuntu”.116 Clearly, if rules or standards are not 
recognised, this will no doubt lead to uncertainty of the law, with judges choosing cases 
as indicated by their individual sense of fairness and reasonableness. Realistically, only 
for the present purposes and because of the doctrine of stare decisis, courts need to 
follow the law that has been set before in respect of substantive fairness of contractual 
provisions appropriately altered to address unfair enforcement.117  
 
In Brisley v Drotsky the majority opinion of the court envisaged that the courts would have 
to adopt this approach if the “Sasfin principle” were broadened to prevent the enforcement 
of contractual provisions that are not per se contrary to public policy.118 The one approach 
that may formulate certain general principles and provide certainty in our law is the 
approach known as the “Sasfin principle” which has been developed to prevent the 
implementation of contractual provisions that are not per se contrary to public policy. This 
means that a court may reject the enforcement of a contractual term based on unfairness 
only if the enforcement ultimately would be contrary to public interest.  
 
In the first place, I concur with the Sasfin case where it was stated a the judge must take 
care not to conclude that enforcement would be contrary to public policy merely because 
it would offend his or her individual sense of fairness.119 The court must exercise its power 
to refuse enforcement sparingly, and only in cases in which the element of public harm is 
manifest.120 Also, the circumstances must be such that enforcement would be 
“exceptionally unfair”.121 Indeed, I concur with the statement that to give judges a 
discretionary power beyond this could create considerable legal and commercial 
uncertainty.122  
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Therefore, the solution to deciding whether enforcement would cause manifest public 
harm is for the court to consider the interests of the community as a whole, and not merely 
the interests of the individual parties to the contract or a few members of the 
community.123 Furthermore, the court should avoid attaching too much weight to the 
interests of the party that would be adversely affected by the enforcement. Assessing 
fairness as between the contracting parties requires the court to consider the matter from 
the point of view of each party.124 It is clear from Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings that matters 
that are relevant to determining whether enforcement would be unfair are to include 
whether the party in breach was aware of the breach or could have prevented it from 
occurring, and the prejudice either party will suffer if enforcement is or is not granted. 
 
Nevertheless, from the above discussion it may be adduced that the implementation of a 
contractual provision that is valid may not be offensive to public policy if it can be justified 
in the broad commercial context in which it is sought. This generally boils down to 
determining whether the creditor, having regard to the circumstances that already exist 
or which may arise in the future, has a sound commercial reason for wanting to enforce 
the provision in question.125 In my opinion the approach followed by the court in 
Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings, the supreme court of appeal decision, is correct. The 
decision supports the notion that when entered into freely and voluntarily, contractual 
obligations must be honoured by the parties. I contend that a party’s freedom to contract 
also is a right that needs to be appreciated by contracting parties themselves as much as 
it is a constitutional right that is worthy of protection by the courts. 
 
Second, I support this argument by recommending that there is a need for legislative 
protection for the parties that is not necessarily included in the above-mentioned acts that 
apply only to certain consumers. The recognition of the remedy of a reduction in the rental 
for a lessee that has received partial use and enjoyment of the leased object is not 
sufficient. There is a need for the adoption of the Control of Unreasonableness, 
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Unconscionability, or Oppressiveness in Contracts or Terms Act that was recommended 
by the law commission. The appropriate way in which to address the problem of changed 
circumstances at common law has not yet been considered by the constitutional court. 
There currently is no particular principle to ease the hardships because of changed 
circumstances in the law of agreement.  
 
4.3 A new precedent set for subsequent court decisions 
 
In 2018 a new case, Roazer CC v The Falls Supermarket CC,126 was decided by the 
supreme court of appeal where the court stated that good faith negotiations could not be 
granted because the respondent had failed to notify the appellant of its intention to 
exercise the option to renew the lease agreement timeously as per the provision of the 
contract. The court held that in a purely business transaction the court cannot rely on the 
principle of ubuntu to import a term that was not intended by the parties and to deny the 
other party the right to rely on the terms of a contract.  
 
Therefore, the court upheld the sanctity of a contract to which parties had consciously 
bound themselves, thereby promoting the common law principle of pacta sunt servanda. 
It therefore is important to ensure that one is fully acquainted and comfortable with the 
terms of the contract that one is signing. It appears that the courts are becoming unwilling 
to be lenient and to allow the parties to a contract to rely on principles such as good faith 
and ubuntu, and that they will not import terms into a contract that are not present or 
relevant on the face of it. Furthermore, the court contented that it is not competent to 
import a term not intended by the parties based on the principles of ubuntu. 
 
In conclusion, if a contract is prima facie contrary to constitutional values, questions of 
enforcement would not arise. However, the enforcement of a prima facie innocent 
contract may implicate an identified constitutional value, and if the value is unjustifiably 
affected, the term will not be enforced. It is important to consider the fact that the terms 
of this contract were not prima facie inconsistent with public policy; the relative position 
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of the parties was one of bargaining equality; the parties could have negotiated a clause 
in terms of which Southern Sun was given notice to remedy a breach before the contract 
was cancelled; and the timeous performance Southern Sun could have diarised well 
ahead of time to monitor this important monthly payment and it could have effected other 
means of payment such as an electronic funds transfer. 
 
I agree with the approach adopted by the court in Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings. A 
contractual party’s freedom to contract is not only a constitutional right but is also a right 
that should be respected by the contracting parties themselves. The decision supports 
the notion that when a contract is entered into freely and voluntarily, contractual 
obligations must be honoured by the parties. However, the constitutional court in 
Barkhuizen stated that there is a need to strike down the unacceptable exercise of 
freedom to contract and that any clauses that were found to be against public policy 
should not be enforced by the court. 
 
It is safe to conclude that, as in the past, the supreme court of appeal has re-endorsed 
the notion that people should always be allowed to contract as they wish, whether or not 
the terms operate unfairly or harshly against one party, because the court is eager to 
perpetuate the fiction that in most cases parties to contracts have equal bargaining power. 
The only difference is that as stipulated in the Roazer and Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings 
cases. It is important to note that these cases do not intend to portray the supreme court 
of appeal as reluctant to subject the law of contract to the discipline of the constitution. 
Whether or not one agrees with the majority decision of the supreme court of appeal in 
the case of Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings, this case represents a decisive shift in the law 
of contract and substantially upholds the notion of freedom of contract.  
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